Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Inferential role: the inferential role is the variation potential that linguistic expressions have within conclusions. The reference to truth thus emerges only indirectly in the evaluation of the overall argumentation and not every speaker is aware of this. See also Inferential content, Inferences, Inferentialism, R. Brandom, cf. Conceptual role, Roles._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Jerry Fodor on Inferential Role - Dictionary of Arguments
IV 179 Inferential Role/Fodor/Lepore: originally their appeal consisted in providing a causal role as a basis for solving Brentano's problem of irreducibility to the neurophysiological. (> Computation), >Intentionality/Brentano. IV 180 Fodor/Lepore: either you adopt the semantics of the conceptual role or you are a holist. >Conceptual role semantics._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch, Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
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> Counter arguments against Fodor
> Counter arguments in relation to Inferential Role
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-28